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MORE CRIMINALISATION IN
CANADA: MORE OF THE SAME?
HARRY GLASBEEKt

I

INTRODUCTION

Let me begin by telling a story of a recent Canadian occupational health and safety
tragedy.
A large diffuse corporation, Great Lakes Power Corporation (in turn owned
by a blue chip giant Canadian company called Brascan), hired a corporate
contractor, Neat Site Vegetation Experts, to fell trees around electricity lines
owned by Great Lakes Power. Because of the failure by these companies and their
experienced supervisor to abide by their own safety rules, an avoidable set of
events led to the terrible burning of young Wheelan, an employee who had been
on the job for two days. He was clearing vegetation around power lines when a
broken line fell on him. He lost all but one of his limbs and suffered very serious
bums to the rest of his body. About two years later, during the North American
blackout of 2003, he died in his apartment. He had made great efforts to
rehabilitate himself with the help of his activist father. He had reached the stage
where he could live by himself, with the part-time aid of an attendant provided
through the workers' compensation regime. That day, a very hot one, the attendant
had left him in his air-conditioned flat at the usual time. An hour later the
electricity went off; so did the cooling system that was essential to his survival,
given his condition caused by the extreme burning. He died alone. A few weeks
after his death, Neat Site and Great Lakes Power were convicted of the offence of
improper instruction of new employees after charges against their senior officers
had been dropped. The corporations had pleaded guilty to the health and safety
offence. Great Lakes Power Corporation was fired $260,000. Campbell,
Wheelan's direct supervisor, was charged with failing to clear the area when treecutting took place and of failing to use guy ropes to control the direction of falling
trees. He was convicted. His unchallenged claim that Great Lakes Power and Neat
Site had ignored those safety requirements, causing him to ignore them, was not
acceptable to the court. But the court did take this argument into account when
sentencing Campbell, basically only rapping his knuckles.'
"

I

Professor Emeritus and Senior Scholar, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. Paper presented by
H Glasbeek at Industrial and Corporate Manslaughter Seminar, Flinders University Law School,
and Group Research on Employment and Workplace Change, University of South Australia,
Adelaide, South Australia, 12 March 2004.
The judge did not impose a fine on Campbell, putting him on probation for 18 months, ordering
100 hours of community service and requiring him to write a letter describing what he had
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What emerges from this sad tale? Two things.
First, the visceral need of the victim and public to have a senior flesh and
blood person held accountable for harm caused by an employer's reckless
indifference was left unsatisfied. The regulators' initial attempt to fimd such a
culpable human was given up in return for a guilty plea by their corporate
employers. The regulators, eager to show their 'zeal', did pick on a lowly
employee. This is not the way to appease the needs of the public, as the judge's
sentencing decision made clear. Second, it was a tragedy that is, with some
variation in the dramatic details, frequently replicated. When the outcomes are as
eye-catching as those in the Wheelan story is, they draw attention to the
systemically engineered preferential treatment reserved for some shocking
behaviour by certain types of actors, in particular, private wealth owners who are
wrapped in a corporate veil.
In this presentation, the focus is on what kinds of political and regulatory
responses are elicited by the gravity and the recidivism of, and the prevailing
benign approach to, the infliction of harms by for-profit corporations. At this
seminar, we are gathered to talk about one major response to this set of problems,
namely, the attempts to improve the effectiveness of criminalising corporate
activities when they injure and/or kill workers. This response comes onto the
political agenda when, in especially egregious and legitimacy-menacing
circumstances, corporate actors have been sought to be made criminally
responsible and the prosecutions have failed.
In Canada, the particular triggering event was the Westray mine disaster in
May 1992. The mine exploded and 26 workers were killed. By that time, in their
less than two years of operation, the mine operators had been found to have
violated the rather feeble Nova Scotia mine regulations 52 times. The Ministry of
Labour had never sought to impose sanctions for these violations. The drama was
increased by the fact that famous politicians had been involved in 'sweetheart'
deals with the mine operators, giving extremely favourable, uncommercial loans
and guarantees to the operators. This fuelled the suspicions of the victims and their
neighbours that wealth owners, rather than workers, were to be protected and
coddled by the elected government and its appointed regulators. This was
exacerbated when prosecutions against the regulators were dropped on the basis
that this would facilitate the prosecution of the corporate mine owners and its
senior officers but, in the end, both these prosecutions also were dropped. The
corporation went into bankruptcy; the senior officers were able to mount a series

learned from the events. He was asked to make a contribution of $500 to the bum clinic that had
treated Wheelan; see Mary Beth Cuffie, 'Workers: Last Line of Defence' (2004) OHS Canada
56. The judge wrote: 'In my reasons for conviction [of Campbell] I indicated the primary cause of
this workplace accident was the failure of GLP [Great Lakes Power] to establish asafe workplace
culture, wherein the workers would have a safe protocol and structure to follow in their
workplace functions', The Sault Star 16 March 2004; see also the same paper's issues of 21 and
25 March 2004, for more details of this case. The judge's analysis goes directly to the theme of
this paper, in particular, and to the seminar's at which it is presented, in general.
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of procedural defences that postponed their trial until a Commission of Inquiry
reported. 2
This Commission found that systematic indifference to human life
characterised the employer's modus operandi. The title of its report, 'Westray: A
Predictable Path to Disaster', said it all. In its conclusions, the report opined there
had been '[A] complex mosaic of actions, omissions, mistakes, incompetence,
apathy, cynicism, stupidity and neglect ... there was a palpable disregard for even
the most basic rules of safety'.' After the publication of this damning report, the
prosecution dropped the charges against the flesh and blood senior officers of the
Westray mine operators. The prosecutors' argument was that despite or, rather,
because of its findings of egregious insouciance, the Commission of Inquiry had
found that there was no one specific cause or actor responsible for the explosions.
Hence, the prosecutors decided, they would not be able to muster sufficient
evidence of mens rea against the individual senior officers they had charged.
England's Herald of Free Enterprise,4 Victoria's Esso Longford5 and Canada's
Westray mine disaster cases had much in common. In each of them a number of
people died as a result of neglect of, or indifference to, dangerous conditions. In
each it was hard to pin-point the commission of a specific set of acts done with
malevolent intent by anyone who might make the corporation responsible. In each
of them it was found that the circumstances that had led to the calamity had been
structured into the system of operation of the employing/producing corporation. In
each of them, there was an initial unwillingness and, then, perceived inability to
apply the criminal law to the corporation or to any of its significant actors. The
remedy proffered in all of these jurisdictions was to legislate to overcome the
technical problems that were claimed to have led to these politically discomfiting
outcomes.

II

THE PERCEIVED TECHNICAL
DIFFICULTIES

It is hard to apply criminal law concepts based on individual free will to artificial,
mindless constructs. In the past, judges, having been largely responsible for
bestowing a human-like legal personality on corporations, were forced to pretend
that these ethereal beings, to which I like to refer as blobs, were capable of
2

For accounts of the Westray affair, see Shaun Comish, The Westray Tragedy (1993); Dean Jobb,
CalculatedRisk (1994); Chris McCormack (ed), The Westray Chronicles (1998); Harry Glasbeek

and Eric Tucker, 'Death by Consensus: The Westray Story' (1993) New Solutions 3, 4.
3

Nova Scotia, Commission of Public Inquiry, The Westray Story - A PredictablePathto Disaster

(1997).
4

For accounts, see Celia Wells, Corporationsand Criminal Responsibility (1993); Stewart Field

and Nico Jorg, 'Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: Should We Be Going Dutch?' (1991)
CriminalLaw Review 156.
5

For accounts, see Victoria, Royal Commission into The Esso Longford Gas Plant Accident Report

(1999); DPP v Esso AustraliaPty Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Cummins J,July
2001); Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, The Prosecutionof Corporations(2002).
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thinking and acting, like you and I. So, they came to attribute thoughts and acts to
the corporation by holding the thoughts and acts of senior officers to be those of
the corporation. This has made it terribly difficult to hold corporations criminally
responsible. The identification of the senior officer who is to be characterised as
the guiding mind and will of the corporation is discretionary and fraught with
difficulty, especially in large endocratic organisations, even more so when group
organisation is used by a corporate enterprise that has compartmentalised its many
coordinated and integrated activities. And, when corporations are multi-national,
the problems can be overwhelming. This set of problems has unintended and
unacceptable flow-on effects. If the person who acts with the appropriate mens rea
is acting and intending as if s/he were the corporation, then s/he is not acting and
intending as an individual in her/his own right. In those circumstances, the senior
officer adjudged to be the guiding mind and will is not to be held criminally
responsible. Not only, then, is it difficult to hold a corporation, a blob, criminally
responsible, the starting premisses giving rise to this difficulty also make it is hard
to hold a flesh and blood human being responsible for serious violations of
standards that lead to grave harm.'
This explains the nature of the novel criminal responsibility schemes being
spawned. My first task is to describe the Canadian one. It is entitled 'C-45, An Act
to Amend the Criminal Code (criminal liability of organisations)' (2003). It is
found in an amendment to the Criminal Code - a statute that is within the federal
government's jurisdiction. It is referred-to by its bill name, Bill C-45, or as the
Westray Bill. It was first pushed by the electoral party friendly to unions, the New
Democratic Party, as a consequence of the clamour by the Steelworkers Union, the
union associated with the workers at Westray. It was introduced as a private
member's bill. A Senate Committee recommended that the government enact the
proposed Bill. In due course, the government produced its own version of this kind
of legislation. All this took nearly 12 years to come to fruition, the Bill receiving
Royal Assent in November 2003. It was proclaimed on 31 March 2004.
Some of its more salient provisions follow.

6

This is the genesis of the spate of statutory provisions that impose direct duties on directors and
officers for failures to abide by statutory requirements imposed on corporations. The illogic of
these measures apparently is off-set by the need to hold someone, anyone responsible; see Harry
Glasbeek, 'More Direct Director Responsibility: Much Ado About ... What?' (1995) 25
Canadian Business Law Journal 416; for my appraisal of the effectiveness of these kinds of
provisions, see 'Crime, Health and Safety: Meanings.of Victoria's Failed Workplace Deaths and
Serious Injuries Bill and its Equivalents Elsewhere' (Working Paper No 29, Centre of
Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of Melbourne, 2003).
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III

THE CANADIAN ENTRY INTO THE

CORPORATE CRIMINALITY STAKES
In addition to the old ways in which corporations can be made criminally
responsible, that is, via the identification doctrine developed judicially, the
legislation imposes new criminal liabilities in respect of workplace safety that are
to be founded on a specific set of new legal duties written into the Criminal Code.
The new s 217.1 provides '[e]very one who undertakes, or has authority, to direct
how another person does work or performs a task is under a legal duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm to that person, or any other person, arising
from that work or harm.'
Section 217.1 has two significant impacts. First, it will impose criminal
responsibility for harm done to people outside the workforce. Up to now, unlike
the circumstance in Australia, this responsibility to the neighbouring public had
only been found in the Nova Scotia occupational health and safety regime. The
scope of this new responsibility has been potentially widened by the definition of
bodily harm as 'any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the health or
comfort of the person and that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature'.
That is, bodily harm includes diseases as well as traumatically caused physical
harms.'
Second, the duty to take care is no longer restricted to managerial level
employees. It is imposed on any one who undertakes or has authority to direct
others in the performance of their task. This could reach quite low into the
hierarchical organisational charts of an organisation. Up to now, only occupational
health and safety legislation in Ontario, British Columbia and Manitoba had
imposed a legal duty to comply with the statute on employers, directors and
supervisors. The new Criminal Code duty is imposed on those people as well as on
foremen, lead hands, co-workers, throughout Canada. This is a cause of anxiety
for unions who are afraid that it may put their members at greater risk than before.
This anxiety is fed in part by the short legislative history of the recent amendments
to the Code. In its recommendations to the government, the specially struck Senate
Committee to consider the private member's bill had proposed that there be a new
crime created to make directors and senior officers criminally responsible. This
was not done and the ensuing imposition of a wide-sweeping duty on
representatives writ large suggests that the government did not want to single out
directors and executives and let 'ordinary' employees off the hook.'

7

8

This has been seen as potentially valuable to anti-tobacco activists who contend that the
provisions could be used against workplaces that permit employees to be exposed to second-hand
smoke; see Neil Collishaw and Heidi Meldrum, 'Protection from second-hand tobacco smoke'
(Press Release, January 2003).
Government Response to the Fifteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human
Rights - Corporate Liability<http://www.iustice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/ccl rom/hearings. html> at
November 2002. Another possible concern, one that might trouble employers, is that the
expansion of categories of individuals to whom the duty attaches may lead to a reluctance by low
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When an individual inside an organisation burdened with the new legal duty is
identified, the prosecution must establish that it was, in fact, breached by that
individual. Two important points need to be made. First, the duty is akin to that
found in the pertinent regulatory schemes. But, for the Westray Bill it is not
enough that there be a breach of the standard set by the relevant occupational
health and safety regulation. The breach has to meet the usual criminal standard of
recklessness or intent. It will not suffice to establish a lack of due diligence, as it is
in prosecutions under the occupational health and safety statutes. The burden of
proving the criminal intent infusing the violation of the duty is on the prosecution
and it is the criminal onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Second, as if to offset these onerous burdens, it is no longer necessary for the prosecution to show
that the breach was the result of any one individual's conduct. A number of
representatives' acts may, together, constitute the breach that satisfies the first
criterion to establish the crime, namely, the violation of a breach of the legal duty.
Once it has been proved that there has been a physical breach of duty for
which a representative charged with discharging that duty can be shown to have
had an appropriate guilty state of mind when committing the breach, the
employing organisation will be held criminally responsible if senior officials with
policy-making or important managing authority9 either have failed to act to
prevent, or have operated in a manner which prevented them from discovering,
behaviour that had the potential to lead to breaches of the legal duty by
representatives at a lower level. Again, mere negligence will not do: this is a
criminal statute and the senior official or executive is to be shown to have departed
from the appropriate standard of care of supervision in some gross way. Such
gross negligence will exist where the senior official or executive knows that a
lower level' 0 representative is committing an offence and does nothing about it.
Indeed, in those circumstances, not only will the employer be held criminally
responsible, but so too will the senior official or executive.
What Canada's Criminal Code amendments do not do is to hinge
responsibility on what has come to be called corporate culture. The government
thought the concept too vague. It noted that, in Australia, the Crimes Act (Cth)"
had not as yet provided any case law that would clarify what corporate culture

9

10

11

level employees-cum-managers (foremen, lead hands) to undertake responsibility to get necessary
work done.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Canada) s 2 defines senior officers in this way. This was done to
overcome the difficulties created by the decision in 'Rhone' (The) v 'Peter A B Widener' (The)
[1993] 1 SCR 497 (SCC) where only persons having policy-making powers were said to
constitute guiding and directing minds capable of making the corporation criminally responsible.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Canada) s 22.1. These senior officials or executives may also be held
personally criminally responsible if they intentionally participated in the commission of the
violation or directed its commission. They will be held culpable on traditional criminal grounds.
Their employing corporation/organisation also can be held criminally responsible for a crime
requiring more subjective fault than a crime of negligence does, say, fraud or murder, if the senior
officers were, in part at least, acting for the benefit of the corporation/organisation; s 22.2. This is
the expanded version of the identification doctrine espoused in Canada's Bill C-45.
See above n 8 where the Canadian Justice Committee made this point specifically about The
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), implemented in December, 2001.

8 FJLR 391

HARRY GLASBEEK

might mean. Arguably, however, Canada's criminal law's amendments are not too
far away from whatever it might mean. This is because the employer will be
criminally responsible whenever violations of a legal duty are due to operational
failures and supervision by management, those functionaries who have the
capacity to give an employer its cultural character. Moreover, the sanctions that a
court may impose upon conviction are to take into account the way that the
employer reacted to the wrongdoing. For instance; Did it compensate victims? Did
it penalise the responsible representatives, senior officials or executives? Did it
institute preventive measures to avert recurrences of the problem? In addition, a
court may put the employer on probation, requiring it to make restitution, to
establish better policies and to communicate these to workers, the public and a
monitoring court. The order also may command the guilty employer to appoint
officials with specific duties in respect of the identified problem. Further, publicity
may be required, putting pressure on the employer to institute a new cultural
approach. 12
The language of 'employer' has been used because the amendments do not
actually speak of corporate criminal responsibility, but of organisational
responsibility. It encompasses, therefore, any organisation that indicates to the
public that it has set itself up to attain a common purpose. It includes corporations,
trade unions, volunteer organisations, partnerships, co-operatives, municipal
bodies, etc. It is hard to understand why the government reacted to an occupational
health and safety-inspired problem in this way. Two points ought to be made.
First, it denotes a departure from the well-established doctrine that a trade union,
as such, could not be held criminally responsible because it did not have the
required legal personality. 3 Second, this deliberately chosen approach emphasises
the fact that, to the government, the nature of the relationship between employer
and employee and the reason for its creation, do not matter. No distinction is
drawn between private for-profit activities and public not-for-profit activities.
While the dangers created in these two spheres of productive activity sometimes
may be the same, their regulation might be dealt with quite differently. By not
drawing this distinction, the government indicates that it does not want any weight
put on the profit motive that drives market activity. It does not want to
countenance the idea that for-profit production puts a particular spin on the
structuring of risk. This is so clearly illogical that it betrays the depth of the
ideology that governs regulatory theory. I will return to this theme.
So much for the description of Canada's Criminal Code amendments. In
addition to the scope questions adumbrated above, there are potential
implementation problems. One is that the width of the duty imposed under s 217.1
may lead to the scapegoating of lower level employees. This is potentially counterproductive. The legitimacy difficulties created by The Herald of Free Enterprise,
Esso-Longford and Westray were spawned by the fact that low-level employees
12
13

For the sentencing powers of the courts under the new provisions, see ss 718.21, 732.1 (3.1).
There may be an intriguing constitutional problem here: does the federal government have the
jurisdictional power to bestow this kind of legal personality on provincially-created trade unions?
This cannot be explored in this presentation.
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who technically might be held responsible were, in fact, mere helpless cogs in an
enterprise's machinery of operation. They were, in fact, not the responsible agents.
Making it easier to convict these rather hapless agents seems a curious choice for a
legislature intent on demonstrating that it is sensitive to the underlying problem.
Second, a practical difficulty with the application of the new provisions looms. It
springs from the fortuity of Canadian constitutional law.
The jurisdiction over criminal law rests with the federal government, that over
occupational health and safety with the provincial governments. Criminal acts
committed in the provinces are to be prosecuted by provincial attorneys-general.
They also are charged with the enforcement of the provincial occupational health
and safety statutes. They have been most reluctant to use prosecution as a means to
enforce these statutes. They are encouraged to take this anti-prosecution approach
by their respect for the conventionally embedded acceptance of the Robens'
principles. These emphasise that the so-called workplace partners are in the best
position to ensure efficient compliance, because both employers and employees
share the same needs and goals in respect of safety and productivity. There is a
resultant preference for the internal responsibility system over the use of the
external responsibility one, a preference for negotiated settlement of disputes over
settlements enforced by the State. 4 This attitude is reflected in the record of
occupational health and safety enforcement. A few illustrations should suffice.
Crown officials are reluctant to pursue jail terms and/or probation for
occupational health and safety offences when corporate actors are the employers,
so much so that the rare resort to these penalties are well-known in Canada. Some
of these exceptional events include: owner of small company fined $70,000 and
six months jail for fatality; co-owner of corporation fined $10,000 and probation
for 18 months, occupational health and safety course to be attended for
electrocution of young worker; supervisor - 29 week-ends of jail for fatality
because of non-guarding of moving parts; supervisor got 45 days of jail for
occupational health and safety violation that led to death of a passengeron a train
... " That is, the use of jail is seen as draconian and used sparingly and not very
stringently.
In our context the question becomes: to what extent will the same local
attorneys-general choose to prosecute under the new Criminal Code provisions?
On the one hand, there is a clear legislative signal that this could, and, perhaps
should, be done when egregious behaviour attracts public attention. On the other
hand, even if there is a consequent greater willingness to reach for external
14

15

Committee on Safety and Health at Work, Parliament of the United Kingdom, Robens Report
(1970-1972). This Report's recommended approach is the key to the legislative regimes extant in
Australia and Canada; see Commission of Inquiry into Occupational Health and Safety (NSW)
('Williams Report') 1981; Ontario, Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in
Mines A-G (1976) ('Ham Report').
The details are taken from an article in OHS Canada,March 2003, in which the editor noted that
provincial prosecutors 'are not going to be pursuing every error, mistake or judgment that
somebody has made, only the very special circumstances where people engage in criminal
activity', the examples in the text being evidence of how 'tough' prosecutors will get when
aroused.
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enforcement, it may be tempting to use that furnished by the not-so-stigmatising
provincial Occupational Health and Safety Act, precisely because it is less
stigmatising. The belief that productive actors should not be characterised as
criminals is likely to continue to pervade conventional thinking. For another, it is
much easier to convict under the occupational health and safety regime than under
the new criminal provisions. I have noted the different burdens of proof that
apply. 6 This potential unwillingness to reach for the new criminal provisions is
bolstered by the fact that the content of the legal duty on which they are based is to
be found by reference to the provincially applicable occupational health and safety
Act. This will beg the question for inherently conservative attorneys-general: if it
is the OccupationalHealth and Safety Act that has been violated, why not resort to
the remedies provided by that Act? In sum, it is to be expected that the new
criminal law provisions are not likely to lead to a flood of prosecutions.
This should suffice to give an outline of the new Canadian provisions and a
feeling for the many questions that are likely to trouble the enforcement agencies
and policy-makers. I now return to offer my 'take' on the genesis and nature of
schemes like the Canadian one and others of its ilk proposed and enacted
elsewhere in our common law jurisdictions.

IV

ARE WE CHANGING THE FORM RATHER
THAN THE SUBSTANCE?

My starting point is that the impulse behind this current tendency to pass laws
such as the Canadian amendments discussed and the just-enacted Australian
Capital Territory legislation, 7 as well as the proposed (and abandoned) Victorian 8
and Queensland 9 statutes, and also the contested, but still on the table, English
draft,20 arises from the fact that some conventional assumptions underpinning the
legal regulation of social relations and activities have come under closer scrutiny
16

A related point ought to be noted. Under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, corporations
have successfully argued that, if an inspector has reason to believe that his/her investigation may
lead to a prosecution, the corporation is entitled to have him/her to get a warrant to search for, and
to seize, evidence; see R v Inco Ltd (2001) 155 CCC (3d) 383 (Ont CA). This raises questions
about whether evidence gathered by occupational health and safety inspectors without a warrant
can be adduced into evidence in any subsequent criminal trial. While these difficulties are not
insuperable - especially if some of the evidence is 'real' evidence - they will likely work to
make provincial prosecutors think even more carefully before they initiate prosecutions under the
Westray Bill.

17

Crimes (IndustrialManslaughter)Amendment Act 2002 (ACT).

18
19

Crimes (Workplace Deaths and Serious Injuries) Bill 2001 (Vic).
Queensland, Dangerous Industrial Conduct, Department of Justice and Attorney-General,
Discussion Paper (2000).

20

See, Law Commission of England and Wales, Legislating the Criminal Code: Industrial

Manslaughter Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: The Government Proposals
(1996), The Home Office, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/consult/invmans. htm>.
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than usual in recent times. The assumptions I speak of are those structuring (i) the
criminal law, (ii) the facilitating legal devices designed to promote market
activities and actors, here corporate law and (iii) the welfare laws that regulate
productive activities, here those concerned with occupational health and safety.
When an event, like a Westray, a Herald of Free Enterprise or an Esso/Longford
occurs, it is likely that more members of the public will see that criminal law is not
evenhandedly, neutrally applied - as it is supposed to be. Moreover, it becomes
more evident than usual that facilitating, supposedly neutral, interventions such as
corporate law and corporations, are anything but mere facilitative, neutral
institutions. And, simultaneously, regulatory law that supposedly is designed to
allow for acceptable compromises in respect of risks and standards of behaviour, is
more likely to be perceived as being weighted to favour some, here the
incorporated employers, at the expense of others, here the workers. There is a
sudden realisation that nothing is as it should be. The legitimacy of all our claims
and tools are put in issue. This creates pressure on the dominant political forces
that want to remain dominant to restore confidence in the system. In the context of
occupational health and safety it becomes crucial to bolster the public's confidence
that it is right to continue to believe: that criminal law will be applied to all who
violate laws in analogous fashions; that laws designed to facilitate commerce and
market activities are to be just that and not lead to built-in advantages for some, ie
corporate actors, over other commercial and market actors and that regulatory laws
will be redesigned to produce truly consensually reached compromises about risks
and standards in the workplace. In short, these moments dictate that, to retain
hegemony, it is necessary to enact legislative reforms.
The new statutory instruments which are being examined at this seminar are
designed to attain these hegemony-maintaining goals but they do this primarily by
aiming themselves at solving the criminal law problem. The focus is to overcome
the legitimacy problem created by criminal law's apparent non-application (or, at
best, its uneven application) when it comes to corporate productive activities. In
essence, the reforms suggest that the reason for the less than vigorous application
of criminal law to corporations is to be found in the technical difficulties
associated with the identification doctrine. This doctrine, though well-meaning, is
accepted as inapposite for complex organisational structures. What is needed then,
the reformers believe, is to re-model the established doctrine. This has led
Professor Gobert to argue (rightly) that the reforms produced proffer nothing more
than a set of variants of the identification doctrine. Elaborate as they are and
innovative as they seem, they still make it necessary to find one or more
individuals who have committed a true criminal offence and these people must be
of the right status (albeit one that can be defined differently than it is presently) to
make it sensible to hold the corporation - the complex organisation responsible. 2' Two points need to be made.

21

James Gobert 'Corporate Criminality: New Crimes for the Times' (1994) Criminal Law Review
722.
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First, the nature of these responses is instinctive: legislators are not serious
thinkers. They respond to immediate political problems. In the occupational health
and safety field these include: how are they to deal with their
agencies'/prosecutors' apparent incompetence/unwillingness/ inability to enforce
the laws? As politicians, they expressly or impliedly promise the public that
democratically enacted laws will be enforced without fear or favour. How are they
to deflect attention away from their own complicity in the catastrophic events, if
any, as in the Westray saga that drew the public's attention to the enforcement
deficit? How are they to defend the general political economic entente that might
be threatened if people came to question its very underpinnings and accompanying
institutions, such as corporate law and the market machinery it and the
occupational health and safety regulatory scheme are designed to serve? As they
wrestle with these issues, it is important to remember that politicians are not
pre-occupied with satisfying scholars who are interested in the accurate
description and treatment of organisations, such as corporations. If their proposals
meet such scholarly concerns it will be a happy coincidence rather than a planned
outcome. This is why serious, radical, thinkers like Gobert are less than impressed
by the measures on offer thus far. Not only are they just band-aid solutions, it is
likely that, as in the Canadian case, they will only deal with technical, not
structural, problems.
The statutes passed and those on offer continue to assume that corporations
are just market facilitating tools and that the regulatory regimes, such as the
occupational health and safety ones, are posited on the right assumptions, those
which underlie the Robens values. These are that there is a shared set of interests
between employers and employees, that the risks their joint activities throw up are
causes for joint concern and that the materialisation of these risks are regrettable
outcomes that ought to be eliminated. This is best done by learning from
experience and then by setting standards that are malleable. The parties to the
risk-creating activity should work together to identify risks and to devise means to
eliminate them. The State should only be there to guide them and formalise their
decisions and to hold recalcitrant actors to account. What is assumed is that the
parties are virtuous in their participation in a virtuous system of production, one
regulated by market dictates.22
Policy analysts who share the assumptions of virtuous actors and activities
assumed by the Robens-based schema and who acknowledge that the regime can
be and should be perfected, will be more contented than others will by the
22
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statutory reforms on offer. To them they may be seen as co-optable and thereby to
come to dovetail with their preferred approach. For pyramid modellers such as
Braithwaite/Ayers/Fisse et al 3 the developing measures may be relatively
welcome because they emphasise efficient self-regulation and a willingness to
impose compliance systems on the more recalcitrant of corporate actors, just what
these scholars advocate in their modelling. I do not align myself with this
impressive school of scholars and policy-makers. Despite having argued for some
time that criminal law ought to be applied more liberally to corporate actors,24 I do
not feel very happy about the legislative efforts to make it easier to criminalise
corporatebehaviour. I feel uneasy because these efforts appear to embed the very
premisses that, in my view, give rise to the dreadful injury and death toll in the
workplace.
I do not like the fact that there is a continued assumption that productive
activities are neutral. That is, I am uncomfortable with the Robens assumption that
no matter who the actors are, what their relationships are, what the purpose of
production is, risks are created. This suggests that whether production is
undertaken to satisfy wants as opposed to needs does not matter; it suggests that
whether the producers are co-operators/partners/public servants as opposed to
employers/employees/private actors does not matter; it suggests that whether or
not the relationship is inherently coercive (rather than truly voluntary) does not
matter; it suggests that whether production is undertaken to produce a good or
service for its own sake or for profit does not matter. These assumptions and their
implicit messages are illogical. If, say, needs, rather than profits, or public, rather
than private, accumulation were the raisons d'etre of productive activities, the
balance between worthwhile risk and the desirability of the outcomes of
production would be differently calculated by very different processes.
Consequently, indeed inevitably, the standards produced and the methods and
eagerness to enforce them would be different. This is so obvious that it is almost
trite to make the point. But, despite its manifest logic, it is assumed away by the
premisses underlying the regulatory scheme we favour. Undaunted by plausible
alternative arguments, the Robens system's premisses are that market capitalism is
(a) the norm and (b) natural. If these assumptions are wrong and it is because of
their assumptions that we cannot stem the slaughter in the workplace (and for
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those interested in words, note that these manslaughter provisions acknowledge,
ever so faintly, that this is what may be happening, unwanted slaughter) will
continue and new legitimacy problems will arise despite the passage of the
reforming legislation.
Further, a corollary assumption is that the tenets of market capitalism furnish
the substratum of the legislative innovation, the corporation for-profit. That is, it is
assumed that the corporation is a market actor, one that fits the Robens' model's
starting assumptions about the political economy. But, if it is a market actor in any
sense at all, it is one that distorts the operation of the idealised market, that is, of
the model that provides the justification for the Robens scheme (because of its
normalcy, because of its naturalness).
Functionally, the corporation is an aggregate of capitals and people (workers
and investors of capital), not a site where individual marketeers come together to
contract and remain discrete actors. I will not engage the extensive efforts by law
and economics scholars to prove the opposite here; I have made my riposte to
these scholars elsewhere.2" My thesis is based on the legally estabished
on-the-ground fact that the corporate vehicle is designed to provide limited
liability for shareholders, that is, it bestows fiscally limited responsibility on
risk-creating actors. Prima facie, this constitutes a contradiction of the market's
personal responsibility system. Corporate law goes further: it provides legal
immunity for shareholders, a repudiation both of market principles and of the
liberal law ones on which criminal law is posited, namely that individuals are
responsiblefor their conduct. It provides this immunity because, upon the act of
incorporation, the contributed capitals become the property of the newly created
corporation, a separate legal person. The deployment of that property to yield. a
stream of income for the investing shareholders is to be done by the corporation.
Because it is a blob and not a person, it does so through its management team,
boards of directors (appointed by the shareholders) who, in turn, appoint executive
officers. That is, any deployment of property that inflicts harms or leaves debts, is
not the result of the shareholders' conduct, even though it was done to enure to
their benefit. These would-be beneficiaries, therefore, cannot be held to account
for the wrongful conduct of the blob acting through its human agents, the
management. This line of logic, one that arises from the legal architecture of the
corporation, provides, as previously noted, analogous legal immunity for
managerial functionaries because, when they act and think, they do so as the
corporation and not as market individuals or sovereign liberal individuals. While
some of these aspects, as previously noted, have been mediated by the direct
imposition of personal responsibility on managers26 and by some aspects of the
new provisions under examination, the starting point to determine who is
responsible for corporate wrongdoing essentially still is what it was.
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The corporation is a site where legally irresponsible people have incentives
to have profits pursued at any cost, even unlawfully if need be.
This leads to pressures on corporate management teams to maximise profits in
any way possible. It makes sense, therefore, for these managers to use their capital
and ideological clout to mould the legal environment in which corporations are to
operate so as to facilitate, improve and enlarge profit-making opportunities. And,
whatever successes they have in this regard, they also will be tempted to violate
laws that impede profit-maximisation. In respect of the first strategy, the corporate
sectors have enjoyed a great deal of success of late. The pace of privatisation and
deregulation is increasing markedly. Standards are being diluted; not only are
regulations and their enforcement under daily attack, but the acceptability of the
logic of privatisation feeds (and is fed by) the appetite of contemporary
governments to leave it to market actors to regulate themselves.27 As to the second
strategy, the pursuit of profits continues to use illegal means, much as it always
has.28
In this context, the current movement towards the criminalisation of corporate
behaviour might become a useful counterweight. But it will only become so if it
rejects the very assumptions and premisses that are underpinning this erosion of
public responsibility promoted by, and that enure to the benefit of, private actors
garbed in corporate clothing. There are good reasons to fear that this negation of
these basic assumptions is not about to take place. If this is true, the new criminal
provisions may work in a counterproductive way. Herein lies the reason for my
unease.
The new criminal law provisions set out to make it easier to convict
corporations, to remedy what are seen to be the technical problems arising from
the identification doctrine. The remedies provided implicitly acknowledge that
corporations have a distinct life as organisations, that is, there is an acceptance that
the corporation is more than the sum of its component parts. The premiss is that
the legal personality bestowed by law that analogises the corporation to an
individual human being permits the corporation to flourish in the legal world, but
does not describe reality in any useful way and, therefore, leads to tensions and
dysfunctionalities. This dovetails with the line taken by an important theoretical
school. Its proponents have argued for a recognition of the corporation as a
dynamic unit, one capable of the development and maintenance of a culture
27
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distinct from that of its constituent members and one for which special criminal
law ought to be devised.29 The new statutes go some way towards the attainment
of this intellectually appealing characterisation of the complex organisations we
call corporations. In so doing, however, they support an idea that would give the
corporation a political/social essence that the fiction theory of legal personality
does not. These legislative reforms are helping to transform the apolitical, amoral
blob into a social and cultural being.
Under the aegis of the identification doctrine, the corporation was
characterised as an individual, as a unit that could not be further divided. This had
bestowed an enormous convenience: for legal purposes, the corporation could be
treated as being technically analogous to a human being. But, only for those
purposes. There was no convincing suggestion that a corporation had become the
real equivalent of a human being in biological, emotional and social terms.
Vincent emphasised the remaining distinction between sentient beings and legal
creatures, 30 one which always causes anxiety when corporations demand to be
treated as if they should be entitled to all human privileges. That is, this distinction
is politically significant and, should it fade, it will give corporations even more
sway than they already have. Arguably, the Westray Bill and its equivalents may
have this kind of effect. They may boost to the status of the corporation by making
it more likely that it will be perceived as a quasi-governmental entity. Let me
sketch this speculative, alarmist, argument.
In concrete terms, the large publicly-traded corporation already wields
enormous political power. The capacity to make the threat of a capital strike more
effectively than ever has been improved by the hugely increased amounts of
aggregated capitals in relatively fewer and fewer entities. The deepening
pervasiveness of consumerism and the commodification of everything, the
revolving door schemes for functionaries who, first, serve government agencies
and then the corporations they regulated (or vice-versa), the already-noted tide of
privatisation and deregulation, 3 all signify that corporate capitalism has put itself
on a very good bargaining footing vis-a-vis our elected governments that
supposedly represent the interests of all citizens. The resulting context is one in
which corporations are increasingly looked-to for help by governments when they
are regulating. That is, corporations participate in the setting of standards that they
are increasingly going to be asked to administer on behalf of hands-off
governments. Making them criminally responsible in the way the current wave of
29
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legislative reform is doing intensifies these tendencies. As I noted in my sketch of
the Canadian provisions, the statutes (even more so where they try to hold
corporations responsible for their 'culture', as the Canadian one does not do
explicitly) posit that individual corporations, as such, are to be responsible for the
specific manner in which they will respond to the regulatory schemes they have
helped establish in the first place. These statutory schemes envisage that the
criminalisation processes are there to aid governments obtain compliance by
having to intervene less with corporate structure and operational organisation,
rather than more. These statutes implicitly treat corporations as regulatory
agencies. The statutes may be exemplars of what Garland has called the movement
towards responsibilisation. He writes that
there has developed a new mode of governing crime which I would characterize
as a responsibilization strategy. This involves the central government seeking to
act upon crime not in a direct fashion through state agencies (police, courts,
prisons, social work, etc) but instead by acting indirectly, seeking to activate
private action on the part of non-state agencies and organizations ... Its primary
concern is to devolve responsibility for crime prevention on to agencies,
organizations and individuals which are quite outside the state and to persuade
them to act appropriately. 2
While this may appeal to the pyramid modellers, to someone like me who sees the
drive to maximise profits as one that must be curbed to protect the public good,
this potential of the Westray Bill and its equivalents elsewhere is to be feared
because it may enhance the movement to put the corporate fox even more firmly
in charge of the public in the chicken coop. If we are to use criminal law to ensure
corporate responsibility, we may have to look for a different kind of legislative
tool.
What, then, would I want?
I argue that what ought to be done is to make the beneficiaries of anti-social
behaviour, those who profit without risk from diluted and violated standards of
behaviour, to be made personally responsible. That is, I would make the so-far
legally immune major shareholders in large, publicly-traded corporations
criminally responsible. I have made the argument before.33 As far as I can tell, the
only pressing argument against this suggestion is that shareholders are innocent
and passive coupon holders. But, they are passive only because we say that we
will not hold them responsible if they leave the corporation and its management to
their own devices when their conduct is likely to impact the non-shareholding
public. They certainly are not passive when it comes to protecting their
shareholder interests. Indeed, when the investing public is shocked by the
egregious behaviour of corporate managers and their professional advisors, they
are publicly urged to take charge and to act as the functional (albeit not legal)
self-serving owners they are. Note here the oft-heard contention that they should
32
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be involved in setting board policies and exercise control over greedy executives.
Similarly, when a takeover or merger takes place, it is clear to the business press
and to its readership whose ox is about to be gored and who is the person to get on
side if one's interest is to be safeguarded. That is, in a concentrated capital market
like Australia's (or Canada's) there is no mystery about the fact that some
easily-identifiable shareholders have more clout than others over the affairs of a
corporation and that they can be expected to take action for and against the
corporation and its management. More, our statutes provide that markets need to
be notified when major shareholders do things, eg, sell, purchase, nominate
someone on a board, sell or buy things from the corporation. For capital market
purposes, we are more than willing to treat identifiable shareholders as activists, or
people who should be activists, within the corporation. I don't think it technically
would be any harder to do so when it comes to the violation of our established
legal rules designed to protect the public, violations from which they stand to
profit. We can demand that they monitor and set standards of corporate behaviour
lest they be held responsible for their wrongful conduct as if they were receivers of
stolen goods.
It is not legal or economic logic that stands in the way, but a lack of political
willingness to change our regulatory mindset. Only if we do change this mindset
and force those who profit from corporate wrongdoing and skullduggery to face
the consequences will questions be raised about the appropriateness of certain
productive practices, about the desirability of risk-creation for the sake of profit. It
is these questions that are not confronted when our regulatory schemes are devised
on the basis that these issues are best left to formal and informal bargaining on a
very uneven playing field.

